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B R Ambedkar’s reinterpretation of Buddhism gives us an 
account of action that is based on democratic politics of 
contest and resistance. It relies on a reading of the self as 
a multiple creature that exceeds the constructions of 
liberal autonomy. Insofar as Buddhist groups do not 
jeopardise or restrict their members’ capacities and 
opportunities to make any decision about their own 
lives, they do not risk violating democratic principles. But 
to remain socially relevant they must continue to 
contribute to a practical impact on the social world 
which is so neatly intertwined with the political in 
present-day India.
Buddhism is one of those religious doctrines that has per-sisted for about 2,500 years and during this period has u ndergone profound radical changes.1 The last century 
has seen a revitalisation and expansion of Buddhism through-
out south and south-east Asia. Its major tenets have been 
modernised and reformulated by many political leaders, especially 
B R Ambedkar (1891-1956). While his attempt was to give an 
ethical foundation to the dalit movement Buddhism emerged 
from this transformation imbued with nationalist associations 
and p olitical aspirations that anchored it in many civil move-
ments in India. The Buddha and His Dhamma (henceforth BD) as 
well as Ambedkar’s numerous articles and books have captivated 
an e ntire generation of academia, social activists and policymak-
ers. In 1935 despairing of Hinduism’s inability to abolish the caste 
s ystem and remove the stigma of untouchability, Ambedkar 
d eclared his intention to convert to a religion that did not e ndorse 
caste hierarchy but would provide the framework of a society 
based upon principles of non-discrimination, equality and re-
spect. In recent years Ambedkar’s reputation has been growing 
again, as some of his ideas seem not only to have survived the 
passage of time but to have taken on a new relevance. One exam-
ple is his account of the way in which there is a need to give a new 
doctrinal basis to religion that according to him “will be in con-
sonance with liberty, equality and fraternity, in short, with 
d emocracy” (1989b: 77). This meant a “complete change in the 
values of life...But a new life cannot enter a body that is dead. 
New life can enter only in a new body” (1989b: 78). 
He assured the people at Yeola in 1935, that though he was born 
Hindu, he will not die a Hindu. Over the years he considered Chris-
tianity, Islam and Sikhism in his search for a new religion, but from 
relatively early on his choice was Buddhism. There was little un-
derstanding of it as a living religion as it had been virtually extinct 
in India for centuries, yet Buddhism was a traditional Indian faith, 
based upon suppositions familiar to most people. More signifi-
cantly it was a religion “that could be conceived as rational, ethical 
and unburdened by sacerdotal hierarchy” (Dirks 2001: 271).
On 14 October 1956, Ambedkar publicly adopted Buddhism at 
a deeksha (conversion) ceremony held in Nagpur (Lynch 1969). 
On that day and the next he led the conversion of a large number 
of followers most of them from the group of Mahars who had 
come only for that purpose.2 A Buddhist scholar who was part of 
the mass conversion movement wrote that “after years of unsuc-
cessful struggle for the basic human rights of his people, he was 
forced to recognise that there was going to be no change of heart 
on the part of caste Hindus: if the dalits wanted to rid themselves 
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of their “age-old disabilities they had no alternative but to 
r enounce the religion into which they had been born” (Sanghar-
akshita 2006: 59).
The mass conversion of dalits brought about a new emphasis 
on the secular ethics of Buddhism that took the campaign against 
brahmanism to a wider Indian stage in two ways. First it led to a 
renewed interest in Buddhism as a way of life and a set of doc-
trines which were different from prevailing ritualised ordinances 
of many religions. The choice for Buddhism in this reinterpreta-
tion was based on “reason” and not “revelation” (Fuchs 2004: 
253). Indian political thought believed that ultimately the values 
guiding our behaviour must have some basis independent of and 
outside human desires. Buddhism differed from most other 
I ndian schools of thought insofar as it did not assume the “exist-
ence of an eternal material or spiritual primary substance out of 
which the manifold world evolved” (Klostermaier 2006: 32). At 
the same time questioning the spiritual and metaphysical ele-
ments of Buddhism Ambedkar also “shunned the esoteric other-
worldliness of religions, as well as their orthodoxies, doctrines 
and dogmas” (Tejani 2007: 63). His investigations led him to 
b elieve that Buddhism offers an ethical ideal of living honestly 
according to principles that require no sustenance from the wider 
cosmos; it undermined the idea of divinity as it never claimed 
any status for a prophet; the focus was on the “agency of the indi-
vidual” (Fuchs 2004: 253-54). It was this character of “worldly 
rationality”, “the emphasis on the will and judgment of the indi-
vidual” that Ambedkar believed could provide the basis for a 
r enewed moral code in society (Tejani 2007: 63). 
Unlike other religious doctrines, a key concept of Buddhist 
doctrine is that of impermanence or becoming which means that 
“everything, be it a person, a thing, or a god, is…merely a putting 
together of component elements” (Love 1965: 56-57). Further, in 
each individual without exception the relation of its component 
parts is eternally changing and is never the same for even two 
consecutive moments. The Buddha explains that an insight into 
the composite world deprives everything of its “substantial indi-
viduality”. Applied to human existence it implies that a human 
being is a composite of skandhas (aggregates) namely: rupa 
(body), vedana (feeling), samjna (perception), samskara (motive 
forces), and vjjana (consciousness). But none of these transient 
aggregates is identical with the self or constitutes an immortal 
substance called the “soul” (Klostermaier 2006: 32).
By admitting members of lower castes and women into the 
sangha (association) the Buddha took steps to destroy social 
i nequalities. Instead of protecting the interests of certain social 
groups, “dhamma” thus becomes a “universal morality which 
protects the weak from the strong, which provides common mod-
els, standards, and rules, and which safeguards the growth of the 
individual” (Sangharakshita 2006: 157). These two changes led 
to what is called “sacralisation of the social sciences” by some 
scholars to describe contemporary developments, in which a 
mode of thinking attempts to rediscover or restore religious ex-
perience and spirituality to its rightful place in knowledge-seeking 
activities (Alatas 2006: 95). It also gave rise to an alternative 
d iscourse that refers to systematic exposition of non-western 
thought with special reference to a new set of concept clusters.
Towards a Dalit Neo-Buddhist Political Thought
Many scholars argue that developing a theoretical framework for 
Buddhism’s engagement with social issues, social justice and 
rights is not in the nature of Buddhism: it is an ontological dis-
course that aims at individual salvation through inner transfor-
mation (Cho 2002). Others are reluctant to identify any n otion of 
human rights as “both human and non-human beings are equally 
subject to transiency or impermanency” (Abe 1986: 202). Damien 
Keown questions whether the idea of human rights can find a 
“philosophical justification within the overall Buddhist vision of 
individual and social good” (Keown 1998: 24). Thus because of 
its emphasis on individual salvation through d etachment, 
B uddhism is often seen as a religion that fails to consider societal 
problems. How does a Buddhist really alleviate suffering? 
B uddhist thought rarely, if ever, addresses the topic of social 
j ustice in the modern sense, that is, in terms of such things as 
h uman rights, the fair distribution of resources, the impartial 
rule of law, and political freedom. 
Given these arguments Ambedkar’s interpretation of B uddhism 
raises many questions: Can dukkha (sorrow) as institutionalised 
social oppression be counted as basis for a theory of social jus-
tice? Is it concerned with the phenomena of power, dominance as 
well as action-oriented political thinking? I argue that Ambedkar 
should be situated amongst those Buddhist thinkers who have 
reframed and reinvented central tenets of Buddhist teaching for 
their community. His interpretation shows how a theory of social 
action can be a plausible ground for a Buddhist concept of social 
justice without endangering the primary focus on individual 
salvation. This implies, to use Mary Douglas’ term an “active 
voice sociology” which motivates people making decisions; it 
emphasises agency and portrays people as active participants in 
their own lives (Douglas 1979: 51). Unlike an institutional approach 
that treats people as if they were only products of institutions this 
approach emphasises people’s influence over the institutions they 
create. In this way Ambedkar has raised a new set of questions 
about the role of religion in social life as the individual becomes 
the main point of reference in the shaping of v alues, attitudes 
and beliefs. He thereby effectively particularises politics as a 
vibrant and unique human activity and thereby develops a critique 
aimed at freeing the subject from domination and violence of 
coercive traditions. It is a central feature of Ambedkar’s political 
vision that for power to be chastened political institutions must 
redress social inequities in civil society. In championing a con-
ception of politics which embraces diverse a ctivities (apart from 
electoral politics) he makes politics c oextensive with concerns 
in the social, cultural and economic life and opens these domains 
to public scrutiny which is not the same as conflating the political 
and social.3
Broadly “traditional” Buddhism makes a sharp critique of civil 
society, the caste system and the socio-moral codes (including its 
views on rights, freedom and justice) on which it is based.4 A 
j ustification for the rejection of hierarchical social structures is 
not hard to find in Buddhist literature – one need look only at 
Buddha’s critique of caste that also holds, in the doctrine of 
no-self, that all individuals are equal in the most profound sense. 
The compelling quality of Ambedkar’s conceptions however are 
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that they have much to do with a radically new articulation of 
Buddhism which originally was about engagement with the 
world apart from the practices of truth, compassion and contem-
plation. But the self understanding of Buddhism remains shack-
led in older philosophical categories that it thinks it has sur-
mounted and which have traditionally looked down on action.
Compared to the voluminous literature on conversion little 
a ttention has been paid to developing concepts in what is broadly 
dalit neo-buddhist thought that differ substantially from those 
found in “traditional” Buddhism. The scope of my inquiry is 
limited to retrieving Ambedkar’s interpretation of what is widely 
known as dhamma which has received relatively little attention. 
For now after some preliminary points on conversion, I elabo-
rate the main principles of dhamma and a theory of social 
a ction. I then attempt to respond to three challenges to Ambed-
kar’s interpretation: empirical claims about the limited agenda 
of Buddhist conversions, difficulties arising out Ambedkar’s 
a pproach to c ulture and the relevance of Buddhism in contem-
porary global society. I argue that the conceptual strategy that 
Ambedkar so brilliantly employs in order to counter discrimina-
tion and prejudice in Hinduism is a double-edged sword: for 
even as the assertion that there is a specific Buddhist approach 
to social ethics and action in dhamma provides us with a valua-
ble analytical device for the production of personhood and sub-
jectivity as a political process, it undercuts the theorising of poli-
tics within a liberal theoretical frame. I argue that the stress on 
freedom to choose one’s religion reworks conceptions of moral 
personhood and ultimately of self and subjective existence that 
throws light on the conceptual underpinnings of secular politics 
in India today.
The Question of Conversion: A Second Look
Before turning to analyse social action in Buddhism I provide 
some preliminary points regarding the scope of this paper. First it 
is not possible to address all the perspectives on the notions of 
social justice and the teachings of Buddhism (Navayana, Hina-
yana, Lamaism, Mahayana). I shall focus on what I believe to be 
the most influential and important interpretation of Buddhism in 
India, namely, dalit neo-Buddhist thought. 
Second, it is necessary to give some clarifications about the 
n ature of Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism which seems so 
eccentric to the academic world of the 1950s, by making a distinc-
tion between fundamental principles and derivative principles. 
Ambedkar’s central claim is that at the fundamental level all peo-
ple should be guided by principles of equality, liberty and frater-
nity as found in liberal political theory. To what extent did he 
justify these principles within liberal theory and to what extent 
he goes beyond its framework by locating them in a “religion of 
principles”, which is the basis for civic government is something 
that needs to be explored (1989b). In this paper, I restrict myself 
to examining the value of Ambedkar’s interpretation that e xtends 
beyond conversion to shed light on contemporary debates that 
range from global ethics, individual autonomy and social action. 
For many scholars that one so committed to liberal democratic 
ideals should ultimately embrace religious conversion as a 
s olution to the oppression of dalits appears paradoxical. 
But while it is appropriate to begin with Ambedkar’s reasons 
for conversion to Buddhism I will only reflect on some points here 
regarding the motivations since they are pertinent to the argu-
ments elaborated in this paper.5 Over the years the existing schol-
arship on the above events has looked at conversion from very 
different and sometimes very contradictory ways. 
To begin with Ambedkar’s redefinition of Buddhist liberation – 
as the amelioration of material conditions and social relation-
ships in this life, did not find ready acceptance among Buddhist 
intellectuals in India. Richard W Taylor (1972: 146) is of the view 
that Ambedkar’s reading of the Four Truths is “little short of an 
emasculation of the Buddha’s Dhamma”. For some his interpreta-
tion as “a political strategy which involved political mobilisation 
of dalit masses directed at creating a counter- culture with politi-
cal underpinnings for the negation of Hindu dominant culture”; 
others oppose this standpoint to claim that Ambedkar “chose 
Buddhism for its moral strength and egalitarian principles for 
a quality social change and not for its use as a political tool” 
(Narain and Ahir 1994: 94). 
I summarise these views as follows. The standard argument is 
that Ambedkar viewed Hinduism as a “religion of rules” and as 
his efforts to transform it did not succeed he chose to convert to 
Buddhism – a religion based on principles of equality. This in-
strumental approach maintains that conversion was a secondary 
principle in order to bring about the liberal principles of equality, 
liberty and fraternity” (Fitzgerald 1999; Lynch 1969). A second 
view upheld by Zelliot (1998: 220) maintains that conversion re-
interprets a historical past; it has given Buddhist communities “a 
new set of religious ideas, a thought provoking image, a series of 
occasions around which to rally which have no historic overtones 
of caste hierarchy”. In addition to the sense of release from being 
untouchable, “there is a sense of belonging to a great past”. The 
theory of previous Buddhist identity fits well into the untoucha-
bles “need of an honourable past, a cultural heritage that can be 
claimed with pride”.
A final approach supports the view that conversion furthered 
some ideals and it was desirable from the point of view of its con-
sequences for the dalit identity as a group. Ambedkar desired a 
religious identity for dalits since he had an enduring respect for 
and emotional commitment to a religious and cultural tradition 
(Gokhale 1993).
In my response I follow the lead given by some scholars who 
have viewed the Buddhist conversion of 1956 that shook Hindu 
society by its separatism and radicalism as that which in fact pre-
figured in early dalit attempts within Hinduism to assert their 
cultural independence (Constable 1997). There is a shift from a 
religious to a secular discourse as Ambedkar attempted to bring 
Buddhism to the “world of social action and social change” 
(Omvedt 2003: 3; Queen 1996: 65). According to T hurman (1978: 
19) Ambedkar’s hermeneutics of Buddhist liberation follows 
N agarjuna, Aryadeva and even Fa Tsang who reframed and rein-
vented Buddha’s central teachings.6 
These arguments are useful for a positive reading in which 
Ambedkar gave precedence to transformation in “social” rela-
tions by questioning the public-private dichotomy or what is 
broadly called the distinction between the social and political 
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sphere in liberalism. Almost all political theorists in the western 
tradition have accepted some justification for separating religion 
from the State. Secularisation is seen as part of a process of mod-
ernisation embracing protestant reformation, the rise of the 
m odern state, the growth of capitalism and the expansion of the 
sciences. All these dynamics are seen to cause religion to loosen 
its dominating influence in political life. However we know that 
each of these carriers of modernisation develops in different places 
at different times and the historical processes of secularisation 
thus vary accordingly. Ambedkar understood the crisis of his 
time; despite constitutional guarantees, individual belief systems 
related to caste practices in the social sphere had not changed in 
India: despite modernisation institutional religion was very 
much influencing everyday lives. I shall argue that his theory of 
action is in response to the dehumanising forces of caste prac-
tices; he seeks to identify the practical context within which 
h uman beings as individuals can actualise freedom as a mode of 
thought in action and regain a sense of individual salvation. In a 
context where Hindu and Muslim communalism comprised the 
meaningful world of political action and discourse, Ambedkar 
subverts the very relationship between the political and social.
I also suggest that like many “classical republicans” he b elieved 
that the voluntary associations which individuals freely form are 
more meaningful and that the good life consisted of participation 
in political activities rather than in pursuit of private (polluting 
or non-polluting) occupations.7 In contrast to the republican tra-
dition he however expects the state to perform a more interven-
tionist role in opposing the ascriptive hierarchy of the caste sys-
tem, to increase the level of security for the oppressed castes and 
to ensure equality of opportunity to public offices. To pursue this 
task of redefining these spheres I focus on Ambedkar’s theory of 
action because it has played an emancipatory role in one of the 
most dramatic events of our time.
Developing a Theory of Social Action 
The goal of Buddhism has been primarily seen as attainment of 
inner peace through the experience of enlightenment often 
d escribed as nirvana (liberation). Now many scholars view 
B uddhism as a way of enlightenment which further means to be 
“compassionate, tolerant, reasonable, moral and engaged in life” 
(Brazier 2002: 1). 
This was not the view that prevailed when Ambedkar wrote 
The Buddha and His Dhamma which was published posthumously 
in 1957. In order to make it relevant to modern society Ambedkar 
had to liberate Buddhism from distortions injected in it by brah-
manical ritualism, and to redefine it as humanistic Buddhism. 
For this he had to retrieve the social message which had been 
buried by modern authors. To accomplish this task he explores 
both thematically and in chronological order the political history 
and theology of early Buddhism and its relevance. 
In the introduction to this work Ambedkar explains his philo-
sophical undertaking along with some key concepts. For him the 
justification of something, the finding of its inherent rationality is 
not a matter of seeking its origins but rather of studying it con-
ceptually. He argues that “if man is free, then every event must 
be the result of man’s action or of an act of Nature. There cannot 
be any event which is supernatural in its origin” (BD: 250). At the 
very beginning two characteristics of Buddha’s teachings are 
e mphasised: their rationality and their social message. He is em-
phatic that the study is scientific in that it deals in a systematic 
way with something essentially rational. In other words it rests 
on the preposition that Buddhism is based on reason and experi-
ence and thus is in accord with science (Fuchs 2004: 310). He 
further remarks that this approach signified “liberation of reli-
gion from social entanglement” making religion free to address 
itself to society; to give (individual) guidance and (collective) 
o rientation (Fuchs 2004: 310). 
The Buddha, Ambedkar claims rejected four theses on which 
brahmanic philosophy rested: that the Vedas are infallible and 
cannot be questioned or challenged; salvation of the soul can be 
had by rituals and sacrifices; principles of a chaturvarna society; 
and the doctrine of karma (BD: 87-89). 
In Book I, part V, Ambedkar traces Buddha’s rational approach 
to Kapila, an exponent of Sankhya philosophy based on logic and 
facts. The tenets of his philosophy, the Sankhya-Darsana were 
that “truth must be supported by proof” (BD: 84) for which Kapila 
allowed two means: perception and inference. He questions the 
theory that there was a being that created the universe (BD: 84) 
as “the empirical universe consists of things evolved and things 
that are not evolved” (BD: 85). It is not surprising that given Kapi-
la’s influence, Buddhism denies the reality of god, understood as 
creator or as absolute, ultimate entity. Buddha did not even claim 
a divine or supernatural status for himself. On the contrary Bud-
dhism is the result of “discovery” and “inquiry and investigation 
into the conditions of human life on earth”. Further it can be ques-
tioned or tested and his followers are “free to modify or even to 
abandon any of his teachings if it was found that at any given time 
and in given circumstances they did not apply” (Fuchs 2004: 311). 
The text examines two main premises that at the centre of 
dhamma is man and the “relationship of man to man in his life on 
earth” and that “the purpose of dhamma is to reconstruct the 
world” (BD: 322). In his search Buddha discovered quite early that 
“since there was so much unhappiness” in the world, it was 
wrong “for him to sit as a sanyasi (holy man) with folded arms 
and allow things to remain as they were” (BD: 112). After attain-
ing enlightenment, he “realised that what is necessary is not to 
escape from the world. What is necessary is to change the world 
and make it better” (BD: 112). He realised that he left the world 
because “there was so much conflict resulting in misery and 
u nhappiness and for which he knew no remedy” (BD: 112). 
In Book IV while discussing the relationship between religion 
and dhamma, Ambedkar elaborates that this path had nothing 
to do with god and soul. He argues that “what the Buddha calls 
Dhamma differs fundamentally from what is called religion”. 
I nstead of seeing religion as “personal” which has no role to play 
in public life, he argues that it is “social”. Further dhamma is 
“righteousness, which means right relations between man and 
man in all spheres of life” in which case “society cannot do with-
out dhamma” (Ambedkar B R: 316). He explains that “the centre 
of religion lay not in the relation of man to god. It lay in the rela-
tion between man and man. The purpose of religion is to teach 
man how he should behave towards other men so that all men 
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may be happy” (BD: 254). The text later mentions, “all prophets 
have promised salvation. The Buddha is the one teacher who did 
not make any such promise. He made a sharp distinction 
b etween a moksha data and a marga data, one who gives salva-
tion and one who only shows the way. He was only a marga 
data. Salvation must be sought by each for himself by his own 
effort” (BD: 218).
While endorsing Buddha’s teachings Ambedkar is at pains to 
distinguish his approach by rejecting four positions of Buddhism 
before reformulating a theory of social action. 
First he rejects the traditional version of Siddhattha’s Parivraja 
(going forth) (Omvedt 2003: 4) arguing that the story of b eing 
moved by an old man, a sick man and a dying man were unrea-
sonable; instead he highlights the political exigencies, and the 
strength of Buddha’s social conscience during a conflict over 
w ater rights. 
Second in the introduction to Buddha and His Dhamma, 
Ambedkar even doubts whether the four Aryan truths (on the 
existence, origin and overcoming of suffering and the path to be 
followed) form the original teachings of Buddha because they 
deny hope to humankind. He claims the four noble truths make 
“the gospel of the Buddha a gospel of pessimism”. Dukkha, the 
origin of sorrow, the cessation of suffering and the way leading to 
the cessation of suffering are caused by the human a ttachment to 
the illusions of the world. Ambedkar cautioned that since the vic-
tim is blamed for the cause of suffering, the traditional presenta-
tion of the “four truths” would be very likely o ffensive and unac-
ceptable to people who suffered face-to-face subordination or 
structural oppression. “Suffering” in Ambedkar’s interpretation 
is in the form of sorrow, misery or poverty that is caused by the 
“exercise of power by one person or class over another” (Tejani 
2007: 63). Queen views these alternations and rejections as ways 
to create a message of social activism in Buddhism. For these 
r easons the goal of the eightfold path is “to remove injustice and 
inhumanity that man does to man” rather than “nirvana” (1996: 
48, 56-57). 
In the introduction Ambedkar alerts us to a contradiction 
b etween the doctrines of anatta (the non-existence of the eternal 
soul), and the doctrines of karma (action) and rebirth.8 For 
Ambedkar Buddha denied the existence of a soul but taught the 
doctrine of rebirth as the doctrine of past karma “is inconsistent 
with the Buddhist doctrine of non-soul” (BD: 343). Ambedkar’s 
interpretation is in contrast to the Hindu belief in a soul that relies 
upon an individualistic and fatalistic interpretation of karma, 
“an inhuman and absurd doctrine” (BD: 344). It is hereditary and 
impressed upon the soul that passes from one life to the next. 
Unlike brahminical Hinduism, Buddhism rejects caste distinctions 
and the karma theory of a soul that is reborn and predestined to 
live out a life determined by its previous action. A person’s value 
is measured by current actions and not by the caste into which 
she or he is born. This negates the idea that current social injus-
tices are a result of past misdeeds. 
Finally Ambedkar claims that the bhikkhu (those who live on 
alms) can be the hope of Buddhism only if he is a social servant in 
a sangha that should be a community devoted to social service. 
Ambedkar tries to rationalise the existence of the Sangha: a 
bhikkhu leaves his home but he does not retire from the world. 
He leaves home 
so that he may have the freedom and opportunity to serve those who 
are attached to their homes but whose life is full of sorrow, misery and 
unhappiness and who cannot help themselves. 
He goes so far to assert that “a bhikkhu who is indifferent to 
the woes of mankind, however perfect in self-culture is not at all 
a bhikkhu” (BD: 435). In this way the dhamma’s origins in social 
concern, its non-Aryan character and the ambiguous role of the 
sangh are departures from traditional views that appear integral 
to the relevance the converts find in it. Thus Ambedkar’s dhamma 
as a social teaching directed to the dispossessed was wrapped in 
social injunctions. According to Queen he consistently addresses 
the physical and spiritual sufferings of historical communities 
with scant reference to a life to come (Queen 1996). Teltumbde 
views some of the concepts related to a happy life that is well-
lived as close to the Aristotelian concept of “eudaimonia” (2007: 
121). It connotes the object for which no other goal is posited as it 
is pursued for its own sake.
Given the discussion above we can argue that Buddhism was 
chosen over and above other religions because as a social gospel 
it gave weight to a theory of social action. Although he stressed 
Buddha’s attack on caste and the dalit’s historical connection 
with Buddhism it should be noted that Ambedkar did not how-
ever identify the Buddha’s message and movement solely in 
terms of a revolt against the caste system; as evident in the story 
of the “going forth”, the social concerns were much wider and 
i nvolved a larger audience. 
If the Buddha’s gospel is seen as essentially social, than so is 
dukkha, the central Buddhist notion of suffering or sorrow which 
is the condition of misery and poverty wrought by social and eco-
nomic injustice. According to Fuchs, the recognition of the exist-
ence of suffering is counterbalanced by an “equal stress on the 
removal of suffering” (2004: 312). Nibbana is not about liberating 
the soul from the material world as for Ambedkar it is “vain to 
escape from the world...what is necessary is to change the world 
and make it better” (Fuchs 2004: 312).
Ambedkar’s ideas about social action and class conflict are 
i llustrated in a speech to the Fourth-World Fellowship of Buddhist 
conference in Nepal in November 1956 in his famous essay Bud-
dha or Karl Marx. Ambedkar rejected a number of Marxist 
a ssumptions including the inevitability of socialism and the use 
of violence to bring about social change but he accepted the core 
of Marx’s ideas as essential to the goals of the dalit movement. He 
also refers to a dialogue between Buddha and Ananda when the 
former discusses avarice and the dangers of possessing private 
goods. Ahir argues that Ambedkar’s interest in Marxism is evi-
dent in his assertion that the term dukkha which is the founda-
tion of Buddha, refers to “exploitation and poverty” (Ambedkar 
1990: 184). Thus the fundamental purpose of dhamma is the rec-
ognition and removal of suffering through human action. The 
emphasis on s ocial action and the rejection of belief in the super-
natural are the significant elements of Ambedkar’s Buddhism. 
This mode of ethical life that emerges falls between the media-
tion of subjectivity and universality which is provided spiritually 
in the dhamma and politically in the modern state. 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  december 4, 2010 vol xlv no 49 61
Critiques of Ambedkar’s Interpretation of Buddhism
Given the drive for equality that motivated Ambedkar to lead his 
people into Buddhism, it is clear why he interprets the dhamma 
in social terms. That this social emphasis led to exclude or to dis-
tort some teachings, fundamental to traditional and canonical 
Buddhism is understandable, yet it raises substantial problems. 
Criticisms of the standpoint expounded earlier come from three 
general directions. I identify these challenges as follows: 
The first challenge relies on empirical grounds that demon-
strate Buddhism in India has a limited range. It is also argued 
that although “traditional Buddhism” valued equal worth of 
h uman beings over considerations of caste, rank and wealth, it 
did not openly militate against the caste system. It seems that as 
the founder of a monastic order, the Buddha addressed himself 
mainly to the goal of moksha (liberation). Thus the early Bud-
dhists were emphatic in their assertion of the equality of all in 
the context of pursuit of the highest spiritual value while, at the 
same time, not denying social distinctions as the norm of every-
day human association.
Ambedkarite Buddhists are treated as a sect mostly viewed as 
religion of mainly one jati, the Mahars. Although rural Mahars 
have refused to perform customary activities related to scaveng-
ing and have given up the practice of consuming beef after con-
version, their recognition and acceptance of subcaste hierarchy 
and untouchability is evidence that Buddhism has not changed 
“anything very radically” (Fitzgerald 1997: 20). Neera Burra (1997) 
in her work notes that traditional Hindu concepts of karma and 
dharma (awakening) persist along with Buddhism practices and 
therefore the dalit Buddhist movement is “a symbol of identity 
transformation” rather than a true religious conversion (p 168). 
I shall address the first challenge here in order to spend some 
time on two other challenges in the last section. I would clarify 
that the Buddhist movement suffered a major setback with 
Ambedkar’s death so shortly after the conversion. It did not re-
ceive immediate support from dalit leaders although there were 
attempts to resuscitate the core philosophical and social ideas of 
Buddhism morally in the vernacular idiom. Indeed division over 
conversion and the nature of the neo-Buddhist movement within 
dalit groups has been an additional impediment. I do not suggest 
that these empirical claims are not true. Neither do I wish to 
u ndermine the empirical claims as no one can deny that ex-dalits 
are subjected to atrocities and ostracism by higher castes. It is to 
protest their place in Hindu society that many dalit groups have 
converted to other religions. Today neo-Buddhists, a group em-
bracing about 90% of the Indian Buddhists are emerging as an 
important political force. For the broad sections of the dalit 
masses that have been confined to lowly occupations, suffering 
humiliation and low self-esteem the spiritual path has brought 
about a major social transformation. Many refuse the impure 
d uties of their caste and seek for alternative occupations. They 
celebrate their own festive days, i e, the birthdays of Buddha 
and Ambedkar. 
The issue that I wish to now raise is the attempt to establish 
religious influence in order to alleviate social-ills leading to an 
emphasis on praxis. While conversion under the liberal option offers 
a possibility for religion to break out of its privatised functional 
ghetto and be repositioned onto the political stage, the possibili-
ties are limited in the modern Indian context. In the a bsence of 
any additional, non-religious measures, including p olitical in-
volvement neo-Buddhists are left with voluntaristic decision-
making and fragmented responses. 
Contemporary Debates on Conversion
In the last decade despite these criticisms we find a major 
growth in numbers of Buddhists in India making them almost 
1% of the population in India. According to the 2001 Census 
there are currently 7.95 million Buddhists out of which 5.83 mil-
lion reside in Maharashtra. Thousands of people from different 
castes have converted to Buddhism in public ceremonies the 
most recent b eing part of 50th year celebrations of Ambedkar’s 
deeksha. A leading newspaper report estimated that in 2006, 
20 lakhs of people congregated at Nagpur, Deekshabhoomi, 
while another six lakh attended the second biggest ceremony at 
Chandrapur on 15-16 October.9 States that witnessed similar 
ceremonies were r eported as Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Madhya 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.10 Earlier, in 2001, a prominent dalit 
leader and Justice Party chief Udit Raj organised a mass conver-
sion where he gave the 22 vows.11 The All India Confederation of 
SC/ST organisations (AICSCSTO) produced a list of dalits who 
had converted since there was criticism from the right wing 
parties for taking this step. 
Some debates have arisen from the clause inserted in the 
I ndian Constitution as the Presidential Order of 1950 according 
to which only the scheduled castes (SCs) professing Hinduism 
were entitled for reservations in public sector employment, 
f ederal and state services and educational institutions run or 
aided by the State. The assumption is that non-Hindu religions 
are not based on caste hierarchies of Hinduism and therefore 
their members do not require special protections of any kind. 
Later in 1956 in response to an appeal of the Sikh community the 
parliament amended the order to include dalit Sikhs in the SCs, 
and in 1990, Buddhist dalits were added in the list to honour 
Ambedkar on his birth centenary. 
Recent debates on conversion seem to be more concerned with 
“Hindu dalits” and their relationship with the “dominant Hindu 
social order” (Wankhede 2009: 35). All this is changing as many 
groups such as the converted dalit Christians and dalit Muslims 
have raised their voices for social justice. For years dalits have 
been removed from the SC category if they convert to Christianity 
or Islam. The exclusion of dalit Christians and Muslims has 
caused great concern as it is contrary to the spirit of a constitu-
tion that promotes secularism and freedom of religion. In 2005 a 
petition was filed in court asking the government to restore the 
rights of dalit Christians.12 This matter was referred to the Justice 
Ranganath Misra Commission which approved the demands of 
the dalit Christians in May 2007. Since then the National Com-
mission on scheduled castes, scheduled tribes (STs) and minority 
commissions have been discussing these matters as dalit Muslims 
have also raised similar demands.13
Apart from the debate over these conversions within the dalit 
community, many state governments have created tensions by 
deciding to grant SC community certificate to children of 
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c onverted Christian parents who reconvert to Hinduism.14 Some 
state governments – Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, 
Himachal Pradesh and Gujarat – enacted and amended The Free-
dom of Religion Acts, known as “anti conversion” laws that are 
supposed to prohibit religious conversions made by “force”, 
“fraud” or “allurement”. Right wing groups have supported these 
prohibitions on the ground of religious revival, moral generation 
and the resurgence of the Indian nation. Many Christian groups 
say that in reality these laws obstruct the individual liberty pro-
vided in the Constitution. Moreover these laws are used to harass 
Christian workers. The law prohibits an individual from using 
“force, inducement or fraudulent means” when contributing in 
speech or conduct to another individual’s religious conversion. 
Most of these responses have been to Christian conversions but 
have raised questions about the relationship of caste, religion and 
affirmative action in general. These laws do not explicitly ban 
conversions in practice but these laws both by design and imple-
mentation infringe upon an individual’s right to convert, and 
repre sent a significant challenge to Indian secularism. There is 
also increasingly a demand to delink caste from religion which 
has serious implications in redefining the beneficiaries of affirm-
ative action policies in India. A public interest litigation (PIL) in 
2009 was filed to include neo-Buddhists as among SC and ST 
c ategory in the High Court, Mumbai to increase the number of 
Lok Sabha and legislative assembly seats reserved for backward 
classes. Regarding this as a systematic denial of rights the peti-
tioner has urged the court to restrain the government from 
a nnouncing the date of the forthcoming assembly elections until 
neo-Buddhists are also given recognition as SCs and STs. If the 
neo-Buddhists would have been counted among the SC, ST popu-
lation in 2001 Census it would add to the existing population the 
latter taking them to be 16.23%.15
Culture and Liberal Politics
A second challenge is that while Ambedkar addressed the prob-
lem of religion he has not given due recognition to culture. Not 
much time was spent in relating the cultural transformation with 
the political strategies of affirmative action or the ideal of secu-
larism. The separate social and cultural identity of dalits was 
c ertainly acknowledged but their tradition was considered 
u nworthy. In social life they were considered as having a sepa-
rate social and cultural entity with the most subordinate and pol-
luting status linked to roles allotted by the caste system. At the 
same time they were included in principle in the Hindu popula-
tion though the different forms of their cultural contributions 
were never acknowledged.
For these reasons Ambedkar tried to stop the traditional 
M ahar work of “dragging the dead cattle out of the villages and 
the practice of eating carrion; dress well, don’t drink don’t beg, 
get educated and be self-respecting” (Zelliot 1996: 131). In 1942 
when recalling the progress made, Ambedkar’s references were 
not only to “political gains but also to the process of self-purifica-
tion of those practices”. He declared that the person from the SC 
community has “stopped eating dead animals and observing 
meaningless Hindu customs and now had the privilege of send-
ing r epresentatives to the legislature” (Zelliot 1996: 131).
A second strong challenge draws on debates on global ethics. 
From the 1970s “traditional Buddhism” and Ambedkarite Bud-
dhism have come into contact with a modernist brand found in 
Nepal, Tibet and South-east Asia, with its innovative stress on 
explicating Buddhist principles and its anti-hierarchical stance. 
In the last two decades Buddhists worldwide have joined with 
other members of religious traditions on human rights (Sivaraksa 
1998). Contemplative aspects of Buddhism which Ambedkar did 
not stress upon are much in vogue today (Zelliot 1992: 194). More 
significantly a new spirit of Buddhism is manifest in the increased 
meditation movements, publications, education, as well as phil-
anthropic works. There is clearly a shift in the thinking of many 
Buddhists from another-worldly outlook to a more active partici-
pation in the affairs of this world. 
To what extent can Ambedkar’s interpretation of social action 
find a positive meaning in contemporary dalit politics? If Bud-
dhism has a social message, and it functions like a civil religion in 
India to what extent can it exist without the backing of institu-
tions and more relevant finances which have become the driving 
force in many countries? Does Ambedkar’s Buddhism have crea-
tive insight and vision sufficient to foster a supranational com-
munity with a sense of collective responsibility? 
Rejoinder: Historical and Philosophical Considerations
Ambedkar’s interpretation of Buddhism and approach to culture 
has to be located within the enlightenment ethos that arrived in 
India along with English education that questioned the founda-
tion of beliefs of the colonial people. In a very general sense he 
was part of a generation of 20th century social theorists who lived 
their formative intellectual lives outside India. Yet in his a rguments 
we can find purposes that place him within the context of activists 
and scholars struggling to redeem the modern project of emanci-
pation under colonialism. To this period belong both the rediscov-
ery and critique of traditions within Hinduism through the social 
reform and radicalism of Jyotiba Phule’s (1827-1890) Satyashodak 
Samaj. Buddhism belonged to those reform movements which 
a rticulated a critique of Hinduism since the fifth and sixth centuries. 
The retrieval and reconstruction of B uddhism took two distinct 
streams – one supported by European orientalists and the other by 
men of subalternalised communities. Anchoring themselves 
s olidly on the resonance of “Buddha’s social message” to that of 
“modernity” the scholars went about the “process of constructing 
plural forms of B uddhism” (Narasu 2002: vii).16
As a leader of the dalit movement who became one of the 
a rchitects of the Indian Constitution, Ambedkar set out to ques-
tion the aims of the national movement. His main argument was 
that political democracy was meaningless without social trans-
formation. Yet the assertion for a casteless society looked 
e xtremely dubious from the point of view of the liberal ideal of 
equal treatment found in the Indian Constitution. In assessing his 
approach to the question of culture, much seems to hang on 
which way around we ask. Whether we are taking liberalism as 
the fixed point and then asking whether and to what extent it can 
accommodate cultural commitment? Or are we accepting culture 
as a frozen and fixed point and asking whether it can be 
a ccommodated within a liberal framework?
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Ambedkar’s approach is to do with neither for reasons I ex-
plore below. From 1933 onwards the defeat in the Poona Pact 
over separate electorates meant that either “untouchables” were 
to be at the mercy of paternalism (toleration?) of upper castes or 
they were to be incorporated in such a way as to render the asser-
tion of “difference” unnecessary. Later in the constituent assem-
bly Ambedkar realised that theoretical arguments on non- 
discrimination and protection of differences for minorities were 
not helpful for dalits to achieve complete swaraj (freedom). Non-
discrimination in civil society means that cultural boundaries 
tend to break down. Members of one group will meet and be-
friend members of other groups and adopt new identities and 
practices. How were the dalits as a group to retain autonomy by 
giving up or retaining their (subordinate or polluting) cultural 
identities? This was unclear. 
In practice, liberal politics in the 1960s was fundamentally 
assimilationist; it incorporated people into the nation state project 
and ignored special rights. When Ambedkar examined the in-
equalities of the social sphere he was arguing against the assimila-
tionist ideals of Gandhi, liberal politics as well as the vocabulary of 
minority groups; he did not want dalits to be integrated into main-
stream Hindu society or to maintain their cultural distinctiveness. 
That was the strength of his argument. He did not ask for preser-
vation of their distinct identity. He urged the dalits to critically re-
flect on their subordinate position and rid them of that identity. 
Moreover they were expected to reject long-standing practices of 
their groups. Unlike many exponents of group rights today, he did 
not ask the dalits to be left alone, or to let them live according to 
the practices laid down by caste society. He did not want the dalits 
to preserve their way of life but to redefine it.
Two developments contributed to the progressive erosion of 
his interest in liberal politics. Ambedkar was aware that dalit 
groups wielded unequal power and that access to policy process 
was unbalanced within the liberal framework he so arduously set 
up; disillusionment with liberal pluralism and group politics was 
setting in. On the one hand, given the widely varying resources 
of different groups, it was clear that access to decision-making 
could be effectively blocked. On the other hand it was becoming 
clear that emphasis on redistributive issues by the Congress Party 
and their keen absorption of prominent dalit issues would reduce 
the significance of dalit “common interests”.
From a liberal point of view, by seeking conversion, Ambedkar 
was arguing for an individual’s freedom to associate, to form 
communities and to live by his own terms based on equal concern 
in the social sphere. A corollary of this is that the individual 
should be free to disassociate from such communities. Initially in 
Annihilation of Caste he writes that 
the assertion by the individual of his own opinions and beliefs, his 
own independence and interest as over against groups standards, 
group authority and groups interests is the beginning of all reform.
 In a scenario where 
the group is intolerant and does not bother about the means it adopts 
to stifle such individuals they will perish and the reform will die out 
(Ambedkar 1989b, 56).
His view placed great weight on individual liberty and the 
n ature of cultural communities as voluntary associations. 
C riticising the chaturvarnya (state of four varnas) system he 
e xplains that “unless there is a penalty attached to the act of 
transgression, men will not keep to their respective classes” 
(Ambedkar 1989b: 60). Since caste membership is determined 
by birth rather than by deliberate choice it is clearly a coercive 
association. There is no option of entry for those born outside 
even though groups might seek to redefine their boundaries. This 
led Ambedkar to argue that there existed a (formal, voluntary 
and inclusive) political community of rights and a (informal, 
c oercive, exclusive) cultural community at the level of civil 
s ociety. This distinction indicates sharply the limits of liberal 
politics he was deeply enmeshed in. 
But my defence of Ambedkar being critical of a liberal view of 
politics will be subjected to numerous objections and needs to be 
refined. Ambedkar had to rework many of his own positions be-
fore embarking upon the conversion to Buddhism. While located 
within liberal framework he was aware of the limitations of its 
moral categories. Working within a liberal polity his focus was on 
ensuring the existence of a context of choice; cultural member-
ship of a new community will proceed from critical reflection and 
thus function as an expression of autonomy. In liberal theory 
i ndividuals are free to leave, to renounce membership of their 
a ssociations and to reconstitute their cultural communities. His 
move towards conversion offered the first systematic critique of 
the nation state project; it returned the study of Indian political 
thought to the traditional dualist perspectives; the problem of 
modern political regimes as resting upon an unencumbered self 
or as communities defining selves and personhoods. 
To resolve this problematic, his systematic exposition, one in 
which fundamental teachings of the human condition are 
a ddressed along with the specific socio-historical conditions, is 
about how different cultures and religions define a path of a ction. 
Let me distinguish three steps in the argument for defending 
what I had presented earlier.
The first step is to start with what Ambedkar calls the “doc-
trine of impermanence”. What comes to be must cease to be. 
There exists only a momentary convergence of factors (Love 
1965: 305). He disputes any permanent and fixed system of 
c lassification of men and depicts the Buddhist notion of “being is 
becoming” as implying that a human being is not the same at two 
different moments of his life.
If an individual self exists momentarily what possible signifi-
cance can be assigned to the moral responsibility for the social? 
This becomes clear with the second step that dukkha was not just 
that of an individual person. Nor was it only of one particular 
caste, the Mahars of Maharashtra to which he belonged (Narain 
and Ahir 1994). A predominant theme in Ambedkar’s interpreta-
tion has been what is called the social self. This conception 
acknowledges the role of social relationships and human com-
munity in constituting both self-identity and the nature and 
meaning of individual life. Thus he defends what may be called 
relational theories of the self. As Fuchs points out, because “suf-
fering, the way Ambedkar conceives it, is primarily inflicted upon 
man by man, dhamma is needed to recognise it and to remove 
this suffering from the world” (2004: 315). Ambedkar introduces 
a perspectival shift into the interpretation of Buddhism; a 
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r eligion which calls upon men to renounce and transcend the 
world is converted into a “prerequisite essential to secure the 
working of society”. In this way “Dhamma at one and the same 
time is seen as a moral code – for both the individual’s conduct of 
life and social interaction – and as a constitutional necessity for 
society” (Fuchs 2004: 315).
The final step in his argument would be to see the objective of 
social change not to be obtained from electoral politics and 
processes leading to modernisation or liberal democracy but 
from changes in individual subjectivity. It is significant that the 
identity he sought was to come not by remaining within the 
caste system against which he was struggling, but by going out-
side it. This identity could not be born in a system which was 
governed by discriminatory social laws but in Buddhism alone 
which made morality the essence and foundation of religion. For 
him “what the Hindus call religion is really law or at best legal-
ised class-ethics”. Its main drawback is that it tends to “deprive 
moral life of freedom and spontaneity and to reduce it to more 
or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed 
rules” (1989b: 76). In 1935 Ambedkar urged at the conference at 
Yeola to consider their religious identity as a choice, not a fact of 
destiny and in this way connected theory of social action with 
individual salvation.
However this would remain a weak rejoinder until we locate 
this within the politics he was pursuing as I have tried to above. 
On the whole it seems prudent to accept the argument that he 
distinguished between concept clusters and juxtaposed such 
moral clusters to the domain of ethics. Ambedkar would respond 
that “traditional” Buddhism had no equivalents for such terms as 
freedom, liberty, individual, action which we use today; from 
that one cannot conclude that it offers no relevant ethical teach-
ings at all – a conclusion that is an obstacle to cross-cultural 
e ngagement. Similarly dhamma is attractive and meritorious in 
many ways but also subject to severe limitations. Actually even if 
the concept clusters are different, Buddhism invokes the idea of 
an individual as necessarily engaged in social contexts and as 
e xhibiting their nature in human interactions and patterns of 
shared responsiveness. 
Buddhism and the Global Society
To the last challenge let me assert that conversion enabled many 
ex-dalits to join the world Buddhist community and engage in 
cross-cultural exchanges ending their isolation as a subjugated 
group. It also enabled them to join forces with other Indian reli-
gious minorities. However, over the years although there have 
been contacts between different bhikkhus the lives of neo- 
Buddhists have been a local affair. Yet in this way the decentral-
ised structure of Ambedkar’s Buddhism makes it very modern; a 
self-organised, non-hierarchical, participatory and non-exclusive 
community. 
The significance of a lack of institutional basis can be under-
stood by relying on the distinction in contemporary political 
t heory invoked by Thomas Pogge between “institutional and 
i nteractional approaches” (Pogge 1992: 105-06). Although 
Ambedkar does not apply this distinction I believe that this is 
important in order to see the relevance of dhamma within the 
global context. The main impacts of economic globalisation is its 
distributional effects worldwide due to unemployment and 
i ncreasing wage gaps between the rich and poor. While these 
d imensions of globalisation are outside the scope of this paper, 
there are other aspects where Buddhism plays an important 
role. As it idealises a monastic way of life and prescribes mini-
malistic lifestyle it may be considered incompatible with the 
consumerism of contemporary post-capitalist cultures. A cur-
sory look at Buddha’s teachings shows that they are concerned 
with the unlimited nature of human wants that can never be 
fulfilled. Its basic purpose lies in its concept of well-being as it 
extorts us to exercise restraint on consumption and advocates 
judicious usage of r esources. Although the trend amongst the 
upwardly mobile dalits that advocate vipashyana (meditation) 
as the essence of B uddhism has been criticised, there are many 
aspects of neo-Buddhist thought that can be developed to attack 
the basic a spects of globalisation. The attempt to gain some 
transcendent perspective is understandable, when immanent 
techniques such as political nationalism, socialism, and even 
economic progress fail. After all in spite of their ever increasing 
power, globalisation instrumentalities leave vast areas of social 
life undetermined and create problems of personal or group 
identity, increasing disparities in wealth, power and life 
chances. Here a conservative o ption grounded in traditional, 
communally-oriented societies offers a more clear path; a reli-
gious message allows the dichotomisation of the world into right 
and wrong; it also sometimes stresses on a particular group- 
cultural code as the manifestation of divine will. 
As part of a liberal option, in most parts of the world religion is 
a domain of voluntary activity on a level with other privatised 
pursuits. Religious organisations and interaction-based networks 
are part of the privatising trends embedded in globalising moder-
nity that have domesticated political spaces. This is manifested in 
inter-faith meetings and in the “dialogue of civilisations” that 
help articulate a new internationalism that goes beyond econo-
mics or technological independence. 
However if there is a social movement that focuses on local 
and global problems, environmental and social justice issues, 
then they can mobilise around vital issues and make a difference. 
In sum regardless of whether the dilemma regarding the dichot-
omy is solved in a liberal or conservative direction, neo-Buddhist 
notions are unlikely to provide a moral foundation for political 
practices and institutions that replace liberal democracy at an in-
ternational level. They will however raise questions as seriously 
engaged participants in contemporary society and politics (Fiske 
and Emmrich 2004). 
Ambedkar’s reinterpretation of Buddhism gives us an account 
of action that is based on democratic politics of contest and resist-
ance. It relies on a reading of the self as a multiple creature that 
exceeds the constructions of liberal autonomy. Insofar as Bud-
dhist groups do not jeopardise or restrict their member’s capaci-
ties and opportunities to make any decision about their own 
lives, they do not risk violating democratic principles. But to 
r emain socially relevant they must continue to have practical 
e ffects on the social world which is so neatly intertwined with 
the political in present day India.
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Notes
 1 Some scholars privileged the earliest available 
texts as Davids in Lopez Jr ed. (1995). For many 
Indian scholars Buddhism has an independent 
tradition see, A K Narain and D C Ahir, ed. (1994).
 2 The Mahars are the largest scheduled caste group 
in the state of Maharashtra.
 3 This could be called ‘fundamentalist’ if it advocates 
the conflation of the political and religious realms. 
Insisting that religious insights and values be incor-
porated in political decision-making and action is a 
conflation of realms but there is no way Ambed-
kar’s interpretation would qualify for this.
 4 I use the term ‘traditional Buddhism’ to refer to 
the teachings of the Buddha that developed 
around 563-483 BC. Concepts in Buddhism have 
been interpreted in different ways and continue 
to be contested. See Sivaraksa (1998). 
 5 I have argued elsewhere that we cannot locate the 
conversion to Buddhism within the tradition- 
modernity debate as his position is much more 
complex (Verma 1999). I had shown some ‘mis-
givings’ about the way Ambedkar interpreted 
Buddhism. Since then I have revised that posi-
tion. See Ganguly for a critique (2005: 158-59).
 6 I think Martin Fuchs goes too far to claim that for 
Ambedkar Buddhism is a “post-religious religion; 
a religion that transcends religious distinctions...
and also a religion which overcomes the cleft 
b etween religion and politics” (2004: 261). 
 7 The term “classical republicanism” is used in a 
broad sense to refer to Ambedkar’s interest of de-
termining the common good and encouraging 
civic commitment among members of the politi-
cal community and his interest in a system of gov-
ernance that stresses liberty and rights.
 8 Belief in karma is the determination of man’s po-
sition in present life by deeds done by him in his 
past life. Broadly it is a concept that explains cau-
sality through which beneficial effects are de-
rived from past beneficial actions and harmful ef-
fects from wrong actions.
 9 “30 Lakh Dalits Convert to Buddhism”, Times of 
India, New Delhi, 10 November 2006.
10 “Hundreds Embrace Buddhism in Gulbarga”, Times 
of India, Bangalore, 15 October 2006. See http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/ 2171942.
11  “Udit Raj Defends Conversions”, Times of India, 
New Delhi, 2 December 2002. Kanshi Ram, the 
BSP leader was cremated as per Buddhist rituals 
though he never converted. See for more “Kanshi 
Ram Cremated as Per Buddhist Rituals”, The 
H indu, New Delhi, 10 October 2006.
12  In 2004: the Centre for Public Interest Litigation 
filed a PIL (civil writ 180/2004) in the supreme 
court which demands that the unjust paragraph 3 
of the 1950 order must be deleted so that dalit 
Christians can be granted SC status.
13  “SC Status for Dalit Christians. Centre Seeks 
More Time”, Indian Express, 24 January 2008; 
Also “The Long Wait: Will the Dalit Muslims and 
Dalit Christians Ever See the Dawn”, Pasmanda 
Muslim Forum, 15 March 2010.
14  “Dalit Christians Can Get SC Status by Re-conver-
sion”, Times of India, Chennai, 3 April 2009.
15  A PIL has been filed by Swwapnil Bhingardevay 
Source: dnaindia.com, 13 July 2009, http://www.
dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_pil-to-include-neo-
buddhists-in-sc-st-category-filed-in-hc_1273443
16  See work on rationalists and social reformers in 
Narain (1980) 14-18; Narasu (2002).
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